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France’s new nuclear doctrine
DAVID S. YOST*
The new nuclear deterrence doctrine announced by President Jacques Chirac in 
January 2006 has rightly been recognized as ground-breaking and potentially 
momentous in its implications, although in fact several of the key changes in policy 
had already been set out in a speech he made in June 2001.1 While France remains 
determined to deter threats from major powers, its main new preoccupation is 
deterring regional powers by making clear that it has developed more employable 
nuclear options. This article reviews the innovations in French doctrine, examines 
factors that may have contributed to the speech’s timing, and considers some impli-
cations of the new strategy.
The innovations announced in January 2006 include the focus on deterring 
state sponsors of terrorism, the threat to attack an enemy’s ‘capacity to act’, the 
more discriminate and controllable employment options, the willingness to launch 
‘fi nal warning’ strikes, the description of ‘strategic supplies’ as a potential vital 
interest, and the presentation of nuclear deterrence as the foundation of a strategy 
of prevention and, when necessary, conventional military intervention. Chirac’s 
speech and subsequent offi  cial commentary have revealed new infl ections even in 
areas of fundamental continuity, such as France’s policy on missile defence and 
deterring major-power threats.
Despite offi  cial denials that the timing of the speech had anything to do with 
current circumstances, several factors may have led Chirac to make the speech at this 
juncture. These include maintaining the credibility of deterrence and presidential 
power, persuading the public and the armed forces to sustain the budgetary eff ort 
required for the nuclear posture, clarifying French deterrence doctrine for external 
and internal audiences, and sending a message of autonomy to Iran and France’s 
key European partners. The new doctrine’s implications include its signifi cance 
* The views expressed are the author’s alone and do not represent those of the Department of the Navy or any 
US government agency. Special thanks are owed to Nigel Basing, Henri Bobin, Alain Crémieux, Thérèse 
Delpech, Jean Dufourcq, Michael Durnan, François Géré, Joseph Pilat, Diego Ruiz Palmer, Mark Schneider, 
Colin Stockman and Bruno Tertrais for their comments on earlier drafts of this article.
1 For background on issues in French nuclear strategy during the years immediately before Chirac’s Jan. 2006 
speech, see David S. Yost, ‘France’s evolving nuclear strategy’, Survival 47, Autumn 2005, pp. 117–46.
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for deterrence and non-proliferation and for France’s relations with its partners in 
NATO and the European Union.
New elements
The most important new element in the doctrine is the clear assertion that state 
sponsors of terrorism are at risk of nuclear retaliation, if they harm France’s vital 
interests. In Chirac’s words, ‘the leaders of states who would have recourse to 
terrorist means against us, as well as those who would envisage using, in one 
way or another, weapons of mass destruction, must understand that they expose 
themselves to a fi rm and appropriate response on our part’.2 As Chirac pointed out 
in a speech in November 2001, the nuclear deterrent was never intended to work 
directly against terrorist groups, but was designed to apply to states.3
The explicitness in citing state sponsors of terrorism as adversaries that could 
threaten France’s vital interests is new in a presidential-level speech, but it is 
consistent with long-standing policy. The assessment of whether the nation’s 
vital interests are threatened has always been regarded as the president’s respon-
sibility under the constitution of the Fifth Republic, and the French have long 
been reluctant to defi ne their vital interests precisely. As Alain Juppé, then foreign 
minister, said in 1995, ‘our deterrent covers any challenge to our vital interests, 
whatever the means and origin of the threat, including of course that of weapons 
of mass destruction produced and used despite the international prohibitions that 
concern them’.4 In other words, France’s policy is similar to that of Britain and 
the United States in declining to regard negative security assurances as necessarily 
protecting users of chemical and biological weapons from nuclear retaliation.5 As 
Bruno Tertrais, a well-informed analyst, pointed out in 2003, this ‘vital interests’ 
principle could also apply to deterring attacks against France with conventional 
missiles (perhaps aimed at nuclear or chemical industries), computer network 
means, sophisticated terrorist methods or radiological weapons, as long as these 
attacks were undertaken by an identifi able state.6 One of the key purposes of 
Chirac’s January 2006 speech, French experts have pointed out in interviews, was 
to warn potential state adversaries that they must not imagine that they could 
‘circumvent’ France’s nuclear deterrent by employing terrorist means.
2 Jacques Chirac, speech at Landivisiau–l’Île Longue/Brest, 19 Jan. 2006, available at www.elysee.fr. 
3 Jacques Chirac, ‘Discours lors de sa visite à la Marine Nationale, Toulon, 8 Nov. 2001’, available at www.
defense.gouv.fr/actualites/discours_pr/081101.htm.
4 ‘Communication du Ministre des Aff aires Étrangères, M. Alain Juppé, à la Commission des Aff aires Étrangères, 
de la Défense et des Forces Armées du Sénat, Paris, 6 April 1995’. 
5 Negative security assurances are commitments by the nuclear-weapon states recognized under the nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon 
state parties to the NPT, subject to certain conditions. London, Paris and Washington have attached note-
worthy caveats to these commitments. For background, see David S. Yost, ‘New approaches to deterrence in 
Britain, France, and the United States’, International Aff airs 81:1, Jan. 2005, pp. 83–114.
6 Bruno Tertrais, ‘La dissuasion nucléaire française dans l’ère du post-11 septembre’, Les Cahiers de Mars, no. 
178, 3ème trimestre, 2003, pp. 115–16. Tertrais has also set out some hypothetical borderline ‘limiting cases’ 
(for instance, an attack against France with conventional missiles that caused few fatalities). The relevance of 
France’s nuclear deterrent in such cases would depend on the judgement of the head of state.
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In March 2006, the French government published a White Paper outlining 
why France has become a target for terrorist attacks and specifying various attack 
scenarios. The long-standing grievances against France include
a past presented as particularly oppressive (from the Crusades to colonization); a military 
presence in Muslim lands (for example, in Djibouti); the support expressed for ‘apostate’ 
regimes, especially in the Maghreb; the declared secularism [laïcité] of the republican state; 
the attempt to organize Islam according to a national model (with the creation in 2003 
of the French Council of the Muslim Faith); and the determination of French judges and 
services to preventively neutralize terrorists and their accomplices.
In recent years these grievances have been supplemented by objections to the 
French law of 15 March 2004 on religious insignia in schools and to France’s 
participation in military operations in Afghanistan. The possible attack scenarios 
include bombings on the model of those in Madrid in March 2004 and London in 
July 2005; strikes against critical infrastructures; and the employment of nuclear, 
radiological, chemical or biological means. In these circumstances, the White 
Paper states, France must ‘not exclude any response’. It recalls President Chirac’s 
January 2006 speech and takes note of France’s right to self-defence under article 
51 of the UN Charter.7
In testimony regarding Chirac’s January 2006 speech, Defence Minister Michèle 
Alliot-Marie suggested that states might employ terrorist means to attack France 
and that terrorists might gain control of a failing state armed with weapons of mass 
destruction:
Faced with regional powers wishing to acquire nuclear weapons, it [France] must take into 
account the danger of terrorist groups being used by their governments. Facing also states 
armed with weapons of mass destruction whose governments could have failed, trans-
forming them into lawless zones, it must consider the implications that would follow the 
seizure of power by a terrorist network.8
In his June 2001 speech, Chirac noted that ‘regional powers armed with weapons 
of mass destruction could … threaten European territory’. Such powers, he went 
on to say, would face ‘absolutely unacceptable’ damage, and ‘the choice would not 
be between the total annihilation of a country and doing nothing. The damage to 
which a possible aggressor would be exposed would be directed above all against 
his political, economic, and military power centres.’9 Chirac repeated these ideas 
in his January 2006 speech, and added that France’s instrument of deterrence is its 
increasingly precise and controllable ability to strike the adversary state’s ‘power 
centres, its capacity to act’, with nuclear weapons.
7 Secrétariat Général de la Défense Nationale, La France face au terrorisme: Livre blanc du Gouvernement sur la sécurité 
intérieure face au terrorisme (Paris: La Documentation Française, March 2006), pp. 33–7, 76–8, 95. See also Piotr 
Smolar, ‘La France se dote d’une doctrine antiterroriste’, Le Monde, 8 March 2006.
8 Michèle Alliot-Marie, Ministre de la Défense, ‘Audition devant la Commission des Aff aires Étrangères, de la 
Défense et des Forces Armées, Sénat, 1 Feb. 2006’.
9 Jacques Chirac, speech at the Institut des Hautes Études de Défense Nationale, 8 June 2001, available at www.
elysee.fr.
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Chirac’s reference to holding an adversary’s ‘capacity to act’ at risk is a second 
new element. In a subsequent briefi ng by a high-level military source, the French 
government explained how an enemy state’s ‘capacity to act’ could be distinct 
from its ‘power centres’. According to press accounts, the military source said that 
France could explode a nuclear weapon at high altitude (between 100 and 200 
kilometres) and thereby create an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) that could jam, 
cripple or destroy all of an enemy’s non-EMP-hardened computers and commu-
nications systems. Depending in part on the altitude and magnitude of the EMP, 
all electronic systems within a radius of hundreds of kilometres could be aff ected, 
and ‘the country attacked would be on its knees for years’, although the nuclear 
explosion would not produce fatal blast, heat or radioactive eff ects.10
As the EMP attack threat implies, France has been seeking more discriminate 
and controllable employment options. Another new element along these lines 
underscored in Chirac’s January 2006 speech was the possibility that some French 
submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) could carry a smaller number of 
warheads than others. This confi rmed that France might undertake what is some-
times called a ‘split launch’—that is, launching only one or a few missiles instead 
of the entire boatload of 16 missiles, as had been France’s policy during the Cold 
War and beyond.11 An SLBM equipped with only one or two warheads could 
cause much less destruction than one armed with six warheads, particularly if 
these warheads were delivered with great accuracy. Moreover, the warhead need 
not be detonated with its full yield potential; the option of exploding only the 
fi rst-stage ‘primary’ (what the French call the amorce) is available. Finally, an SLBM 
with fewer warheads would have greater range options.
A related new element in Chirac’s speech was his reinstatement of the expression 
‘fi nal warning’ (ultime avertissement): ‘We still maintain, of course, the right to 
employ a fi nal warning to signify our determination to protect our vital interests.’ 
This was a recycling of a phrase used regularly until the early 1990s, when the terms 
‘prestrategic’ and ‘fi nal warning’ gradually disappeared from offi  cial discourse.12 
The French have since the early 1990s increasingly described all their nuclear 
weapons as ‘strategic’.
French sources have pointed out that the context and operational content of a 
‘fi nal warning’ use of nuclear forces today would diff er from what was anticipated 
during the Cold War, when the French fi rst employed the term as part of their 
10 Jean Guisnel, ‘Innovation française’, Le Point, 9 Feb. 2006. See also Jean-Dominique Merchet, ‘Davantage 
de souplesse dans la dissuasion nucléaire’, Libération, 9 Feb. 2006; Laurent Zecchini, ‘La guerre nucléaire 
“propre”?’, Le Monde, 3 March 2006. According to one interview source, the threat to conduct an EMP attack 
is ‘controversial’ within the government and the extent to which this threat should be regarded as a central 
element of the new doctrine is therefore ‘speculative’. 
11 According to Laurent Zecchini, the decision to deploy fewer warheads on some missiles was made in 2001 and 
its implementation began in 2003. Zecchini, ‘La guerre nucléaire “propre”?’
12 In 1995 Alain Juppé, then prime minister, referred to the ‘fi nal warning’ option in the past tense in a discussion 
of factors contributing to ‘the hostility of German opinion towards nuclear weapons’. One of these factors, 
Juppé noted, was ‘the memory of a recent period in which German soil was at risk of becoming the principal 
theatre of a nuclear war and perhaps also that of the “fi nal warning” foreseen by our own doctrine’. ‘Allocu-
tion du Premier Ministre, M. Alain Juppé, devant l’Institut des Hautes Études de Défense Nationale, 6 Sept. 
1995’.
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nuclear doctrine. The original meaning of ‘fi nal warning’ was an attack with signif-
icant military eff ects intended to persuade the Soviet Union to stop a westward 
off ensive. In a confrontation with a regional power in current and foreseeable 
circumstances, however, French sources note, the ‘fi nal warning’ strike conducted 
by France would diff er from that in many ways. France’s delivery systems would be 
more fl exible, accurate and controllable; the warhead yields might be smaller; and 
the targets would be selected with the intention of demonstrating France’s ability 
to destroy the adversary state’s ‘power centres, its capacity to act’. In her January 
2006 testimony about the President’s speech, the minister of defence said:
In fact, a potential adversary might think that, given its principles and its known respect 
for human rights, France would hesitate to use the entire yield of its nuclear arsenal against 
civil populations. The President of the Republic has underlined that our country has made 
its capabilities for action more fl exible and henceforth has the possibility of targeting the 
decision centres of a potential aggressor, thereby avoiding the excessive general eff ects 
capable of making us hesitate.13
In subsequent testimony, the minister added that ‘the targeting of decision centres 
… responded to the necessity of being able to strike the operational means of 
regimes by nature not that sensitive to the risks run by their population’.14 According 
to some French sources, an EMP attack would be particularly well suited to trans-
mitting a devastating but theoretically non-lethal ‘fi nal warning’ message aff ecting 
an enemy’s ‘capacity to act’,15 while an attack against ‘power centres’ would cause 
truly unacceptable damage to his political, military and/or economic resources.
Chirac announced another innovation in his January 2006 speech by stating that 
‘the guarantee of our strategic supplies’ could in some circumstances be regarded 
as a vital interest to be protected by nuclear deterrence. The Defence Minister 
specifi ed that the phrase used by Chirac included ‘energy’ resources.16 This degree 
of precision in a presidential speech seems unprecedented. Historically, the French 
have off ered explanations as to why it would be unwise to defi ne which ‘vital 
interests’ might be covered by nuclear deterrence.17 In the most recent defence 
White Paper, published in 1994, the ‘air and maritime approaches’ to France were 
included in the defi nition of ‘core’ vital interests, but ‘strategic supplies’ were not. 
In fact, ‘assuring the liberty of circulation of our strategic supplies’ was listed as 
one of France’s objectives in a ‘regional confl ict not threatening our vital interests’; 
13 Michèle Alliot-Marie, Ministre de la Défense, ‘Audition devant la Commission de la Défense Nationale et des 
Forces Armées, Assemblée Nationale, 25 Jan. 2006’.
14 Alliot-Marie, ‘Audition devant la Commission des Aff aires Étrangères, de la Défense et des Forces Armées, 
Sénat, 1 Feb. 2006’.
15 Zecchini, ‘La guerre nucléaire “propre”?’.
16 Alliot-Marie, ‘Audition devant la Commission de la Défense Nationale et des Forces Armées, Assemblée 
Nationale, 25 Jan. 2006’.
17 For example, in 1982 Charles Hernu, then defence minister, wrote, ‘Are they tied to geographic, economic, 
and political criteria? I will respond that we are the judges of that, and not the adversary, who will have to 
make an inventory of all that we might place in that category. It is up to him to make hypotheses, knowing 
that an error of analysis could turn out to be immediately mortal.’ Charles Hernu, ‘La politique et la volonté 
de défense’, Politique Internationale, no. 16, Summer 1982, p. 13.
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and the security of France’s supplies via maritime routes was listed with the nation’s 
‘strategic interests’ rather than with its ‘vital interests’.18
The French have in recent years defi ned the four ‘operational functions’ of their 
armed forces as deterrence, prevention, projection and protection. Chirac’s inno-
vation in this regard in his January 2006 speech was to present nuclear deterrence 
as the ‘ultimate expression’ of the prevention function and the back-up for its 
conventional military intervention capabilities. In Chirac’s words,
In the face of the crises that shake the world, in the face of new threats, France has always 
fi rst chosen the road of prevention. It remains, in all its forms, the very basis of our de-
fence policy … To be heard, one must also, when necessary, be able to use force. We must 
therefore have an important capacity to intervene beyond our frontiers with conventional 
means in order to uphold and complete this strategy. Such a defence policy relies on the 
certainty that, whatever happens, our vital interests will be protected. That is the role 
assigned to nuclear deterrence, which is directly in keeping with the continuity of our 
strategy of prevention. It constitutes its ultimate expression.
It should be recalled that Chirac chose to give this speech at a location that under-
lined the fact that France has two types of nuclear delivery systems. The submarine 
base at Île Longue and the Naval Air Station at Landivisiau are in close proximity, 
near Brest. This conjunction provided an apt setting for a speech highlighting 
the acquisition and continuing pursuit of new yield, range and targeting options 
for both SLBMs and air-launched ASMP missiles, the latter deliverable by both 
ground-based and carrier-based aircraft.19 An essential element of Chirac’s January 
2006 speech was to confi rm that France has acquired many of the more discrimi-
nate and controllable employment options called for in his June 2001 speech.
Infl ections within continuity
Chirac’s speech and subsequent offi  cial commentary have included new infl ec-
tions even in some areas of fundamental continuity. For example, Chirac’s discus-
sion of missile defence was consistent with France’s policy since the anti-ballistic 
missile treaty regime between Moscow and Washington ended in 2002. That is, 
France is continuing its work (in cooperation with Italy) on missile defences for 
deployed forces, and participating in the NATO feasibility study about ‘protecting 
Alliance territory, forces and population centres against the full range of missile 
18 The 1994 White Paper stated that ‘The integrity of the national territory, consisting of the homeland and the 
overseas departments and territories, and its air and maritime approaches, the free exercise of our sovereignty, 
and the protection of the population constitute the heart’ [or ‘core’] of France’s vital interests.’ The document 
distinguished France’s ‘vital interests’ from its ‘strategic interests’ and its ‘interests that correspond to its inter-
national responsibilities and rank in the world’. It specifi ed two main ‘strategic interests’: (a) ‘the areas essential 
to the country’s economic activity and freedom of trade and communications’, including the security of the 
nation’s supplies, notably via maritime routes; and (b) ‘the maintenance of peace on the European continent 
and in the zones that border it to the east and the south, in view of the exceptional strategic importance of 
the Mediterranean basin and the Middle East’. However, it also said that ‘The frontier between France’s vital 
interests and strategic interests cannot be specifi ed in advance … The demarcation of this frontier depends on 
the country’s political authorities.’ Ministère de la Défense, Livre blanc sur la défense (Paris: Service d’Informa-
tion et de Relations Publiques des Armées, Feb. 1994), pp. 24–5, 57, 64–5.
19 ASMP stands for air-sol moyenne portée — that is, an air-to-ground medium-range missile. The ASMPA (ASMP 
amélioré) is the improved version.
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ia/article-abstract/82/4/701/2624347
by Naval Postgraduate School Dudley Knox Library user
on 02 March 2018
France’s new nuclear doctrine
International Aff airs 82: 4, 2006  © The Royal Institute of International Aff airs 2006
707
threats’ chartered at the 2002 Prague summit.20 Chirac’s caveats about missile 
defence—that no defensive system can be totally eff ective, and that defences 
cannot replace nuclear deterrence—have been standard French talking points for 
years. However, he expressed an unusually positive tone in stating that missile 
defence could complement deterrence ‘by diminishing our vulnerabilities’. In the 
light of France’s long-standing strictures against strategic missile defences as incon-
sistent with deterrence, this new tone constitutes a quasi-breakthrough on the 
conceptual level.
Similarly, Chirac included a new point with respect to the original, enduring 
and most important objective of France’s nuclear forces—deterring major-power 
threats. The President devoted only a sentence to this objective: ‘We are able to 
infl ict damage of all kinds on a major power that might wish to attack interests 
that we would judge vital.’ Chirac’s use of the phrase ‘damage of all kinds’ delib-
erately left the threat vague, and this was consistent with the abandonment since 
the early 1990s of France’s previous ‘anti-cities’ threats. However, this phrase could 
encompass the more limited and controllable strike options Chirac discussed with 
regard to regional powers.
Chirac implicitly referred to potential major-power threats by observing that 
France is ‘not shielded from an unforeseen reversal of the international system, 
nor from a strategic surprise’. Moreover, he pointed out that the M51 SLBM will 
have an intercontinental range. As noted above, arming the SLBM with fewer 
warheads would give it greater range and accuracy, and this could give France 
new ‘fi nal warning’ options in confrontations with major powers as well as with 
regional powers. The need to be able to threaten China and other distant powers 
in Eurasia and the Middle East is reported to constitute one of the rationales for the 
M51 SLBM’s long range. Government offi  cials have in public statements avoided 
referring explicitly to China as a possible target of France’s deterrent posture, but 
have instead made comments such as Alliot-Marie’s January 2005 declaration in 
support of the M51 SLBM: ‘To ensure our security, we must show our capability 
to strike anywhere in a precise fashion from a non-identifi able base.’21
Chirac’s speech, rich as it was in new elements, did not in fact include certain 
innovations that have been attributed to it, notably with regard to nuclear pre-
emption. The President stated that ‘the leaders of states who would have recourse 
to terrorist means against us, as well as those who would envisage using, in one way 
or another, weapons of mass destruction, must understand that they expose them-
selves to a fi rm and appropriate response on our part’. His use of the conditional 
tense in ‘would envisage’ (envisageraient) created an ambiguity that was interpreted 
by Le Monde as implying a willingness to use nuclear weapons on a pre-emptive 
or preventive basis against an adversary planning to attack France’s vital interests: 
‘This formulation calls to mind the American doctrine of preventive action under-
lined in the strategic doctrine adopted by the Bush administration after the attacks 
20 Prague summit declaration, issued by the heads of state and government participating in the meeting of the 
North Atlantic Council in Prague on 21 Nov. 2002, paragraph 4g.
21 Alliot-Marie, quoted in Yves Cossais, ‘Une cathédrale pour le missile M.51’, Ouest-France, 12 Jan. 2005.
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of 11 September 2001.’22 However, French sources have indicated that Le Monde’s 
interpretation of Chirac’s statement is incorrect. (Le Monde’s depiction of US policy 
is also mistaken, it should be noted, to the extent that it attributes to the United 
States an intention to use nuclear weapons preventively.23) While neither Chirac 
nor any of his predecessors as president has explicitly ruled out the preventive or 
pre-emptive employment of nuclear weapons, these weapons are viewed above all 
as instruments of deterrence. From this perspective, operational employment—
the ‘fi rm and appropriate response’ to which Chirac referred—would be in retali-
ation for an enemy’s attack; and the threatened response is intended to deter such 
an attack. It would, according to French sources, be an error to regard Chirac’s 
statement as an endorsement of preparations for pre-emptive nuclear action or to 
infer that France would use nuclear weapons solely on the basis of an adversary’s 
apparent intentions to attack.
It should nonetheless be noted that in the military programme law for 2003–
2008 and other policy statements France has endorsed pre-emptive action with 
conventional means against terrorists. The French have, moreover, asserted that 
their will and capability to undertake pre-emptive action in certain circumstances 
might deter some aggressors, including terrorists.24 The true similarity of French 
and US policies in this domain resides in both governments avoiding the formu-
lation of a declared policy on the preventive or pre-emptive use of nuclear weapons 
while improving their preparedness to undertake preventive or pre-emptive action 
with conventional forces.25
Moreover, Chirac did not break new ground in suggesting that the vital interests 
to be protected by France’s nuclear deterrent might include allied  countries. Indeed, 
22 ‘Chirac et la bombe’, Le Monde, 21 Jan. 2006.
23 Offi  cial US policy statements have long been purposely vague and ambiguous as to whether Washington 
would use or consider using nuclear weapons in response to an enemy’s use of weapons of mass destruction 
(customarily defi ned as chemical, biological and/or nuclear weapons). The words ‘devastating’ and ‘over-
whelming’ have been favoured to describe America’s response options. For example, in 1996 William Perry, 
then Secretary of Defense, said, ‘if some nation were to … attack the United States with chemical weapons, 
then they would have to fear the consequences of a response from any weapon in our inventory . . . In every 
situation that I have seen so far, nuclear weapons would not be required for response. That is, we could make a 
devastating response without the use of nuclear weapons, but we would not forswear that possibility.’ Secre-
tary Perry’s remarks at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, 26 April 1996. On 22 Feb. 2002, Richard Boucher, 
a State Department spokesman, said, ‘If a weapon of mass destruction is used against the United States or 
its allies, we will not rule out any specifi c type of military response.’ Similarly, according to a subsequent 
White House statement, ‘The United States will continue to make clear that it reserves the right to respond 
with overwhelming force—including through resort to all of our options—to the use of WMD against the 
United States, our forces abroad, and friends and allies.’ National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction 
(Washington DC: The White House, Dec. 2002), p. 3. Such statements concern possible US responses to an 
adversary’s use of WMD. The United States does not have a declared policy of being prepared to conduct 
pre-emptive or preventive nuclear attacks. Although no such policy has been articulated, some observers and 
critics have asserted that there is one. The basis for these assertions is unclear. It may be a misunderstanding 
or mischaracterization of US policy, or perhaps a rather hasty extrapolation from documents such as the 2002 
National Security Strategy, the Nuclear Posture Review fi ndings made public in early 2002, and the 2005 draft 
(and never approved) Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations.
24 ‘Loi no. 2003-73 du 27 janvier 2003 relative à la programmation militaire pour les années 2003 à 2008’, section 
2.3.1., ‘Les fonctions stratégiques’, available at www.legifrance.gouv.fr.
25 It should be noted that preventive actions need not consist of ‘preventive strikes’ or ‘preventive war’. Preven-
tive actions may include, for example, the enforcement of weapons embargoes, the interception of illicit 
technology transfers, the conduct of stabilization and reconstruction activities, and the deployment of peace-
keeping forces between former (or prospective) belligerents.
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as far back as the 1972 defence White Paper, the French government noted that 
‘Western Europe as a whole cannot fail to benefi t indirectly from French strategy, 
which constitutes a stable and determining factor of security for Europe … Our 
vital interests lie within our territory and the surrounding areas.’26 French offi  -
cials have made many similar statements over the subsequent decades, although 
the French have consistently refused to participate in the deliberations of NATO’s 
Nuclear Planning Group or to make consultation commitments to their NATO 
allies similar to those made by the United Kingdom and the United States. Chirac 
himself made a comparable statement about the growing solidarity of the European 
Union and its signifi cance for France’s nuclear deterrent posture in his June 2001 
speech. As he noted in his January 2006 speech, France proposed a dissuasion concertée 
arrangement in cooperation with EU partners in 1995.27 (The phrase dissuasion 
concertée might be translated as ‘deterrence supported by continuing consultations 
and substantive consensus’.28) This revival of an old theme is relevant because some 
offi  cial statements have implied that it may have been one of the factors aff ecting 
the speech’s timing.
Internal motives
To what extent was the timing of Chirac’s speech linked to specifi c domestic 
political factors? According to the defence minister, it ‘was in no way tied to the 
current circumstances because it had been foreseen for almost a year that the head 
of state would speak on this subject’.29 The speech was reported to have been 
initially scheduled for October 2005, but postponed because of the President’s 
health problems.30 Moreover, many of the technical improvements—including 
changes in the command and control system—to support more diff erentiated 
nuclear options were completed by early 2005.
26 Livre blanc sur la défense nationale (Paris: Ministère de la Défense, 1972), vol. I, pp. 8–9.
27 Chirac did not mention that at one point during the dissuasion concertée episode in the mid-1990s France also 
expressed a willingness to discuss nuclear deterrence matters in the North Atlantic Council. Gérard Errera, 
then France’s Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council, indicated on 17 January 1996 that 
‘a dialogue on nuclear questions could be introduced within the framework of the [North Atlantic] Coun-
cil, according to arrangements to be determined’. This initiative does not, however, appear to have led to 
any actual dialogue on nuclear questions involving France and its NATO allies. For background, see Jacques 
Isnard, ‘La France n’exclut pas de parler de la “dissuasion concertée” à l’OTAN’, Le Monde, 16 Dec. 1995; ‘Pour 
la première fois depuis 1966, la France accepte de parler du nucléaire au sein de l’OTAN’, Le Monde, 18 Jan. 
1996; ‘L’OTAN accueille favorablement le projet français de “dialogue” sur la dissuasion nucléaire’, Le Monde, 
19 Jan. 1996. The last of these articles quoted the clarifying statement by Michel Barnier, then France’s minister 
for European aff airs: ‘France never proposed opening a discussion in the Nuclear Planning Group and, even 
less, participating in any decision on the planning of nuclear forces … France has no intention to participate in 
the Defence Planning Committee or to join the Nuclear Planning Group.’
28 Alliot-Marie echoed offi  cial French formulas from the mid-1990s in declaring that ‘dissuasion concertée consti-
tuted neither a bestowed deterrence, nor a common deterrence, but was aimed at establishing a discussion on 
the protection of closely interwoven interests’. Alliot-Marie, ‘Audition devant la Commission des Aff aires 
Étrangères, de la Défense et des Forces Armées, Sénat, 1 Feb. 2006’.
29 Alliot-Marie, ‘Audition devant la Commission de la Défense Nationale et des Forces Armées, Assemblée 
Nationale, 25 Jan. 2006’.
30 ‘Problèmes de communication’, TTU: Lettre hebdomadaire d’informations stratégiques, no. 569, 25 Jan. 2006, p. 6. 
According to a French interview source, a new presidential speech on nuclear deterrence had been considered 
as early as 2004.
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Three internal political motives may nonetheless have contributed to the 
decision to make the speech at this juncture instead of postponing it further. First, 
Chirac and his government probably wished to assert the continuing credibility 
of deterrence and presidential power. The President had not given a major speech 
on nuclear deterrence since June 2001. Indeed, some French observers regard the 
speech as overdue, and point out that early 2006 may have been the last opportunity 
to make such a speech prior to the 2007 presidential election campaign in France. 
By making this speech, the President could remind the public that he was still 
the commander-in-chief and counter the ‘lame duck’ eff ect of declining political 
infl uence in the months before his mandate comes to an end in May 2007.
Second, Chirac was clearly determined to justify and explain the budgetary 
eff ort required for the nuclear posture both to the public and to the armed forces. 
In recent years, despite the fact that the cost of the nuclear forces as a proportion of 
the defence budget has reached ‘an historic minimum’ of 9.5 per cent,31 proposals 
to cut back nuclear force investments have been gaining support among military 
offi  cers and politicians who favour increased spending on conventional forces and 
other capabilities. Chirac’s remarks can be interpreted as a plea to France’s politi-
cians (including his prospective successors) to sustain the current modernization 
eff ort and not cut spending on nuclear forces:
It would be irresponsible to imagine that maintaining our current arsenal could, after all, 
suffi  ce. What would become of the credibility of our deterrent if it did not permit us to re-
spond to new situations? What credibility would it have vis-à-vis regional powers if we had 
stayed strictly with a threat of total annihilation? What credibility in the future would a 
ballistic weapon have with a limited radius of action? Thus, the M51 [SLBM], thanks to its 
intercontinental range, and the ASMPA [air-launched missile] will give us in an uncertain 
world the means to cover threats from wherever they may come and whatever they may be 
… Today, in the spirit of strict suffi  ciency that characterizes it, our deterrence policy rep-
resents overall less than 10 per cent of our total defence budget. The credits dedicated to 
it concern high technology and support massively and essentially our country’s scientifi c, 
technological, and industrial eff ort. Ten per cent of our defence eff ort is a fair and adequate 
price to pay to equip our country with an assurance of security that is credible and lasting. 
And I tell you, to put it into question would be perfectly irresponsible.
The third internal motive follows from the second. In the absence of suffi  cient 
public articulations of policy, Tertrais has argued, ‘ambiguities’ and mistaken 
impressions about the nation’s deterrence doctrine could emerge. In his view, 
Chirac’s speech has underscored the relevance of the nuclear deterrent as the 
ultimate back-up for France’s intervention and crisis management policy, and this 
function should be understood by the nation’s military establishment as well as 
external powers: ‘The message is addressed to the military [offi  cers] who question 
the nuclear expenses: if France can intervene anywhere in the world, it is because it 
knows itself protected against the blackmail of a power that would like to prevent 
us from defending our interests.’32
31 Bruno Tertrais, ‘La dissuasion nucléaire reste adaptée’, Défense, no. 110, March–April 2004, p. 15.
32 Bruno Tertrais, ‘Les vertus de la dissuasion nucléaire française’, Le Figaro, 21 Jan. 2006, p. 20.
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External motives
The key external political motives concern France’s allies and potential adver-
saries. With regard to allies, in the same testimony in which she denied that there 
was any link to current circumstances in the timing of Chirac’s speech, Defence 
Minister Alliot-Marie said that ‘the moment has come to re-launch discussions’ in 
the European Union about nuclear deterrence, ‘all the more so because threats are 
multiplying’. She declared that ‘many European heads of state and government 
have made known to the French authorities that they have understood perfectly the 
speech by the President of the Republic … Dialogues with our European partners 
take place, but only at the highest institutional level and with discretion, in order 
to guarantee the secrecy necessary for eff ectiveness.’33 Her testimony in this respect 
was surprising, because many French experts interpreted Chirac’s comments about 
the 1995 dissuasion concertée initiative as wistful rather than purposeful—that is, as 
regretting that nothing came of it rather than as intended to relaunch it.
In apparent contradiction of the defence minister’s view that France wishes 
to relaunch dialogue with EU partners about nuclear deterrence, some French 
interview sources hold that Paris had a message for London and Berlin after the 
failure of the EU-3 diplomacy with Iran—the message being that France is capable 
of autonomous action and reasons accordingly. Moreover, they assert, France has 
greater freedom of strategic manoeuvre than either the United Kingdom, which 
is ‘too closely tied to the United States’, or Germany, which lacks ‘autonomous 
strategic means’. In short, some French observers say, France’s EU partners should 
recognize that France is one of the few states capable of action regarding Iran, 
owing to its military capabilities and engagement in the Middle East.34
In her testimony, Alliot-Marie added that Chirac’s phrase ‘allied countries’ was 
deliberately left undefi ned and that these allies are ‘not necessarily limited solely 
to the member states of the European Union’.35 French sources have noted that 
the phrase ‘allied countries’ replaced the phrase ‘European territory’ used in the 
June 2001 speech,36 and have indicated that the phrase could also refer to non-EU 
NATO countries and, in some circumstances, countries of the Persian Gulf—a 
seemingly unprecedented extension of France’s ‘vital interests’.
The main external motive for articulating new deterrence policies is, to be sure, 
to send a ‘to whom it may concern’ message and thereby infl uence the decisions of 
potential adversaries.37 According to French sources, Chirac was telling France’s 
33 Alliot-Marie, ‘Audition devant la Commission de la Défense Nationale et des Forces Armées, Assemblée 
Nationale, 25 Jan. 2006’.
34 It should be noted that other French interview sources dispute this interpretation and maintain that specifi c 
external political considerations (including relations with Iran) were much less important than domestic factors 
and general doctrinal motives. 
35 Alliot-Marie, ‘Audition devant la Commission de la Défense Nationale et des Forces Armées, Assemblée 
Nationale, 25 Jan. 2006’.
36 Laurent Zecchini, ‘Jacques Chirac défend la pertinence de la dissuasion nucléaire’, Le Monde, 19 Jan. 2006.
37 Chirac’s reference in his 19 Jan. 2006 speech to the need ‘to cover threats from wherever they may come and 
whatever they may be’ reminded some observers of France’s offi  cial ‘tous azimuts’ (all the points of the compass) 
rhetoric regarding nuclear deterrence in 1967–8. France and its NATO allies expressed a determination ‘to 
meet the challenges to the security of our forces, populations and territory, from wherever they may come’ in 
the Prague summit declaration, 21 Nov. 2002, para. 3. 
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potential adversaries that they cannot count on Paris feeling constrained about 
taking action owing to fear of the consequences of using nuclear weapons. In 
other words, France has acquired more usable options and could conduct what 
some French experts have called ‘a strategy of intimidation’ with them, under-
taking ‘fi nal warning’ operations if necessary, with confi dence that the nation’s 
‘vital interests’ are protected by its nuclear deterrent posture.
Despite offi  cial denials that the speech had any relation to the Iran crisis, Chirac 
surely knew when he chose to make it at this juncture that it would be inter-
preted in light of the Iranian situation; and he was evidently willing to accept 
that prospect. Of course, Chirac made no reference to Iran or any other specifi c 
potential adversary in his speech.38 However, the reference to state sponsors of 
terrorism has been widely regarded as an implicit reference to Iran. Moreover, the 
concern with ‘strategic supplies’ of energy resources and the prospect that the Gulf 
countries may be covered by French nuclear protection fi t in with the idea that the 
speech’s timing and content were infl uenced by the Iran situation.
Some French sources maintain that France’s highlighting of its nuclear strike 
capabilities may have a positive eff ect in the diplomacy concerning Iran, by making 
it clear that France has usable military options (conventional and nuclear) and that 
it would therefore be imprudent for Iran to seek nuclear arms. This message might 
serve as one factor, among others, infl uencing Iranian decision-making. The Chief 
of Staff  of the Armed Forces, General Henri Bentégeat, said the day after Chirac’s 
speech that
Iran is indeed certainly a major anxiety, because Iran is a country demonstrating extremely 
warlike intentions, such as, for example, the will to destroy the state of Israel, and it is not 
conceivable for us that a state that does not respect the rules of the international commu-
nity could try to acquire nuclear weapons contrary to all the international treaties.39
Lowering the threshold?
Chirac said a few days after his landmark speech that the new strategy did not 
represent ‘any lowering of the nuclear threshold’.40 However, critics in France and 
elsewhere in Europe have expressed concern that it might increase the likelihood 
of nuclear use in various ways, from extending the list of potential ‘vital interests’ 
in some circumstances to ‘strategic supplies’, to devising nuclear weapons with 
more discriminate and controllable eff ects. One of the criticisms of France’s new 
approach, at home and abroad, has been that it raises the risk of a ‘banalization’ of 
the nuclear threat.
38 French interview sources have pointed out that the March 2006 White Paper on terrorism avoids attributing 
any responsibility to states widely regarded as implicated to some extent in the terrorist attacks against France 
in the 1980s and 1990s, including Iran, Lebanon, Libya and Syria. The White Paper does, however, refer to 
the nationalities of some of the people accused of organizing terrorist attacks that were successfully foiled. 
Secrétariat Général de la Défense Nationale, La France face au terrorisme: Livre blanc du Gouvernement sur la sécurité 
intérieure face au terrorisme (Paris: La Documentation Française, March 2006), pp. 131–4.
39 Interview with the Chief of Staff  of the Armed Forces, General Henri Bentégeat, on RTL, 20 Jan. 2006, avail-
able at www.defense.gouv.fr/sites/ema.
40 Chirac quoted in Laurent Zecchini, ‘Chirac et le nucléaire: L’Europe silencieuse, l’Iran critique’, Le Monde, 26 
Jan. 2006.
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In an editorial on Chirac’s speech, the Financial Times endorsed the logic of 
reinforcing deterrence with more employable weapons: ‘the greater the prospect 
of France being able to limit the scope of a nuclear strike, the greater the chance 
of a French president daring to order one, and therefore the greater the potential 
deterrent eff ect of the force de frappe’.41 While there might well be some merit in 
the decades-old argument that weapons with more limited and controllable eff ects 
would enhance deterrence by making a threatened nuclear response appear more 
feasible and hence more credible in the eyes of a specifi c adversary, such weapons 
would probably not in fact simplify decisions in Paris in an actual crisis to threaten 
to use or to actually employ nuclear weapons by more than a marginal degree.42
As a result, while France will probably continue to develop more controllable 
nuclear employment options with a view to enhancing deterrence, sending a 
signal of restraint and determination, and/or limiting damage in desperate circum-
stances, the French will also seek various means to reduce their dependence on 
threats of nuclear retaliation. As in the past, and as with US and NATO policy, 
the preferred approach will be to uphold and strengthen, if possible, the array of 
deterrence and containment measures—including arms control in some areas—
intended to lower the likelihood of confl ict, terrorism and proliferation. In view 
of the fallibility of international norms, arms control measures, export control 
regimes and other arrangements, hedges against their failure will include military 
preparations. France’s more positive attitude towards missile defence is signifi cant 
in this regard.
Whether the threshold for nuclear employment has been genuinely lowered 
or may simply be perceived as lowered by some adversaries, thereby reinforcing 
deterrence, is only one of the practical questions raised by the new strategy. 
For example, will its nuances be properly understood by France’s adversaries?43 
François Heisbourg has asked,
What type of [terrorist] attack could provoke a nuclear response: London, Madrid, or 
something like 11 September? The limit is impossible to fi x precisely. The risk in wanting 
to be too precise is that of putting oneself in situations in which one looks weak.44
How should France’s adversaries and other nations interpret Chirac’s statement 
that ‘the guarantee of our strategic supplies’ could in some circumstances be 
regarded as a vital interest to be protected by nuclear deterrence? Would France 
threaten nuclear retaliation against a government that decided to stop selling oil to 
it, or against an adversary hindering the shipment of its energy supplies? Or would 
such a threat be too disproportionate to be credible?
41 ‘Relevance of “force de frappe” to terrorist age’, Financial Times, 20 Jan. 2006.
42 According to Jean Klein, a scholar at the Institut Français des Relations Internationales, ‘the decisions taken with a 
view to greater fl exibility in the military instrument would not necessarily translate into a lowering of the nuclear 
threshold’. Klein, ‘La France face à la seconde ère nucléaire’, Le Monde diplomatique, March 2006, p. 3.
43 In Zecchini’s words, ‘It is to be hoped that France’s potential adversaries will have grasped all the subtleties of 
the French deterrent’: Zecchini, ‘La guerre nucléaire “propre”?’. 
44 François Heisbourg, ‘Le discours de Chirac sur l’arme nucléaire a surpris tout le monde’, interview in Le Temps, 
21 January 2006.
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Yet another practical question concerns the controllability of nuclear opera-
tions, including whether EMP eff ects could be limited to the adversary’s territory 
alone. As some observers have pointed out, it might be diffi  cult to control the 
radius of EMP eff ects. The French might therefore be deterred from undertaking 
an EMP attack by the risk of causing unwanted eff ects on an adversary’s neigh-
bours. If adversaries recognized this prospect of France’s ‘self-deterrence’, the 
credibility of Paris threatening an EMP attack might be undermined.
A further diffi  culty may reside in the ‘fi nal warning’ concept reinstated by 
Chirac in his January 2006 speech. As some French interview sources have 
pointed out, it might be imprudent and even dangerous in some circumstances 
for France to constrain its options by declaring that a specifi c strike constitutes a 
‘fi nal warning’. The concept implies that a larger and truly defi nitive strike must 
follow if the adversary fails to change course. Is it wise, some observers ask, for 
France to have its latitude diminished by the ‘fi nal warning’ doctrine? Depending 
on its assessment of the risks and dynamics (and their implications for France’s 
interests) in a particular crisis, the French government might in practice prefer not 
to conduct such a larger strike, even though not conducting it might undermine 
the credibility of its declared deterrence doctrine. In short, despite their doctrine, 
the French may deem it prudent to be cautious and selective in asserting that a 
specifi c strike represents a ‘fi nal warning’.
Moreover, as some analysts have pointed out, for the new strategy to work, 
France will need high-quality intelligence capabilities. The credibility of the threat 
to retaliate with nuclear weapons against a state employing terrorist methods to 
attack France’s vital interests depends on an ability to identify with certainty the 
state behind an attack. The evidence would ideally be suffi  cient to demonstrate to 
the French people and to France’s allies and security partners (and third parties) that 
the French government had solid grounds for conducting nuclear retaliation against 
a specifi c state. Obtaining such evidence may present a great challenge, because a 
state aggressor attempting to ‘circumvent’ France’s nuclear deterrent posture via 
terrorist means would presumably strive to avoid leaving any ‘return address’ 
information and would try to make the attack look like the work of non-state 
actors or other states.45 André Rouvière, a Socialist senator, has drawn attention 
to the risk that ‘provocative manoeuvres’ might be organized to ‘direct suspicion 
against a state not really involved’ in attacking France.46 In Bruno Tertrais’s view, 
‘It would therefore be logical, so that deterrence can be credible in such a scenario, 
for France to dedicate a very important share of its intelligence eff ort to means 
to track [remonter] terrorist networks’ and reliably establish responsibility for 
an attack.47 France has in fact been investing in improved  technical intelligence 
45 In the United States this intelligence challenge has led to the organization of a team of government experts 
capable of performing ‘post-event forensics’ with a view to accurate ‘nuclear event attribution’. See William J. 
Broad, ‘New team plans to identify nuclear attackers’, New York Times, 2 Feb. 2006.
46 André Rouvière, ‘Audition devant la Commission des Aff aires Étrangères, de la Défense et des Forces Armées, 
Sénat, 1 Feb. 2006’.
47 Bruno Tertrais, ‘La dissuasion revisitée’, Notes de la FRS, Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, Paris, 23 
Jan. 2006, p. 3.
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 capabilities, notably satellites, since the 1990–91 Gulf War.48 These investments 
have coincided with the shift away from the Cold War focus on the Soviet Union 
to more global threat assessments and enhanced operational  intelligence assets.49
Inciting proliferation?
Some critics in France, Germany and elsewhere in Europe have declared that 
France’s new nuclear strategy—including the acquisition of weapons with greater 
range, accuracy and fl exibility—amounts to an affi  rmation of the utility of 
nuclear weapons and therefore contradicts eff orts to downgrade their importance 
and promote nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. In other words, under-
scoring the utility of nuclear weapons may incite proliferation and undermine 
non-proliferation regimes.
Some critics argued that Chirac’s speech was particularly damaging to  diplomatic 
eff orts concerning Iran. Rather than helping to persuade Iran to abandon its ambi-
tions to acquire nuclear weapons, Nicolas Richter argued in the Süddeutsche Zeitung, 
France’s new strategy might help convince Tehran that it has a solid defensive 
rationale for seeking nuclear weapons—that is, protection against potential 
French attacks. Moreover, Richter wrote, France’s new threat of nuclear retali-
ation against terrorist attacks was unnecessary, since regimes sponsoring terrorist 
attacks could be promptly defeated by non-nuclear means, like the coalition opera-
tions in Afghanistan after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001.50
In contrast, Michael Stürmer wrote in Die Welt that Chirac had articulated a 
cogent threat analysis and strategy. According to Stürmer, Chirac had off ered 
nuclear protection to France’s allies, including Germany, reconstructed a  strategic 
entente with the United States, and assured the French armed forces that they need 
not be paralysed in an epoch of asymmetric wars.51 Moreover, some European 
observers speculated that drawing attention to military options might be helpful 
in the negotiations with Iran. Stefani Weiss of the Bertelsmann Foundation 
suggested that Chirac’s threat intensifi ed the pressure on Iran, because this was 
‘the fi rst time that a European state … made clear that it is not disposed to let the 
United States alone have recourse, if necessary, to atomic weapons against states 
48 For background, see David S. Yost, ‘France and the Gulf War of 1990–1991: Political-military lessons learned’, 
Journal of Strategic Studies 16, Sept. 1993.
49 One of France’s most noteworthy new assets is the Dupuy de Lôme, a long-endurance signals-intelligence ship. 
It could support the missions of France’s aircraft-carrier, the Charles de Gaulle, which serves as a platform for 
ASMP missile-equipped aircraft capable of delivering nuclear weapons. In addition to collecting communica-
tions data, the Dupuy de Lôme could contribute directly to strike operations—for example, by mapping an 
opponent’s electronic order of battle. According to the Defence Minister, Michèle Alliot-Marie, ‘France’s 
protection cannot be eff ective if surveillance is limited to the national territory. It is necessary to go further 
and further in intelligence and to be capable of intercepting communications everywhere in the world. This 
ship should enable us to obtain a maximum of information, which will enable us to anticipate the threat and 
to try to eliminate it at the root.’ Alliot-Marie, quoted in Vincent Groizeleau, ‘Le Dupuy de Lôme à la loupe, 
enfi n presque …’, Spyworld, 31 Oct. 2005, available at www.spyworld-actu.com.
50 Nicolas Richter, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 21 Jan. 2006, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, EUP 20060 
121036001.
51 Michael Stürmer, ‘Nukleare Antwort’, Die Welt, 20 Jan. 2006.
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whose nuclear ambitions jeopardize international security’. In her view, this made 
a major diff erence that could give a new impulse to the negotiations with Iran.52
Such positive reactions were in the minority. Representatives of opposition 
parties in Germany, including the FDP and the Greens, asked Chancellor Angela 
Merkel to intervene with Chirac to encourage him to exercise restraint and to ask 
him if France still supported the European strategy of limiting nuclear arms. Some 
members of the Bundestag in the CDU/CSU-SPD grand coalition also sharply 
criticized Chirac’s speech as counterproductive for the negotiations with Iran.53
Merkel, however, expressed astonishment at the debate in Germany about 
Chirac’s speech. She asserted that the speech was ‘fully consistent with the long-
standing French nuclear doctrine’ and that doctrinal adaptations to new threats 
were ‘perfectly understandable’. She saw ‘nothing here to criticize’.54 German 
government spokesmen added that they had no doubt that France would continue 
to respect its international obligations.
Rather than emphasizing the incitement-to-proliferation risk, some French 
observers have noted that proliferation confi rms France’s resolution to maintain its 
nuclear forces. Louis Gautier, once the defence adviser to former Prime Minister 
Lionel Jospin and now a national delegate for the Socialist Party on strategic 
questions, recently drew attention to France’s nuclear force reductions since the 
end of the Cold War:55 ‘Since 1990, we have unilaterally disarmed a great deal. 
Nuclear proliferation has continued, and our virtuous eff orts have not brought 
along others.’56 Evidence pointing towards continued nuclear proliferation has 
strengthened support for France’s nuclear deterrent. As François d’Orcival wrote 
in Valeurs actuelles, ‘The Iranian mullahs have given an excellent hand to French 
submariners, who feared seeing their budget trimmed again. The prospect of 
nuclear weapons in Iran, or in any other suspect state, reinforces the existence of 
French nuclear forces.’57
Americanizing French strategy?
The new developments in French nuclear doctrine and capabilities remind some 
observers of certain parallel trends in the United States. Bruno Tertrais has written 
that the policies announced by President Chirac in January 2006 are ‘rather 
52 Stefani Weiss, ‘Ne sous-estimons pas la doctrine Chirac’, Le Monde, 3 Feb. 2006.
53 Pierre Bocev, ‘Le plaidoyer de Chirac pour le nucléaire provoque des remous à Berlin’, Le Figaro, 21 Jan. 
2006.
54 Angela Merkel, quoted in the letter by Gérard Errera, Ambassador of France to the United Kingdom, Financial 
Times, 30 Jan. 2006.
55 Since the early 1990s France has dismantled its short-range Pluton and Hadès missiles and its intermediate-
range ballistic missiles on the Plateau d’Albion, cut back its fl eet of nuclear submarines armed with SLBMs 
from six to four, and reduced the number of weapons for its air-launched ASMP missiles. The number of 
delivery vehicles has thus been decreased by more than half. After conducting the 1995–6 nuclear test series, 
France closed and dismantled its test facilities in the south Pacifi c and ratifi ed the Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty. In 1996 France began dismantling its facilities for the production of fi ssile materials at Pierrelatte and 
Marcoule. For further background, see Ministère de la Défense, Secrétariat Général de la Défense Nationale, 
and Ministère des Aff aires Étrangères, Lutte contre la prolifération, maîtrise des armements, et désarmement: l’action de 
la France (Paris: Délégation à l’Information et à la Communication de la Défense, 2005), pp. 64–9.
56 Louis Gautier, interviewed by Jean-Dominique Merchet, Libération, 19 Jan. 2006.
57 François d’Orcival, ‘L’ultime avertissement de Chirac’, Valeurs actuelles, 26 Jan. 2006.
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ia/article-abstract/82/4/701/2624347
by Naval Postgraduate School Dudley Knox Library user
on 02 March 2018
France’s new nuclear doctrine
International Aff airs 82: 4, 2006  © The Royal Institute of International Aff airs 2006
717
 convergent with those underway in the United States and Great Britain since the 
end of the Cold War’. Indeed, Tertrais has added,
If there is a domain in which one cannot radically contrast Paris and Washington, it is 
surely nuclear policy. The only diff erence that can be noted is that nuclear weapons hold 
a more central place in defence policy for France than for the United States. Contrary to 
what certain analysts think, George Bush’s America has in fact reduced the role of nuclear 
weapons in its military strategy, and no longer considers these weapons as the sole means 
of strategic deterrence at its disposition.58
The growing similarities in French and US deterrence policies have not been 
widely recognized, partly because of the currency of distorted presentations of 
US policy.59
Despite their substantial reductions in deployed nuclear forces and in types of 
delivery systems since 1991, both France and the United States have (like Britain) 
maintained ‘continuous at sea deterrence’ with ballistic missile submarines—a 
capability initially designed to deter major-power threats, and still relevant 
primarily for this purpose. In recent years, however, both Paris and Washington 
have become increasingly preoccupied with regional powers armed with nuclear, 
biological or chemical weapons, and have shown an interest in new nuclear capa-
bilities to enhance their ability to deter these powers. At the same time, as noted 
earlier, both governments have avoided articulating a policy on the preventive 
or pre-emptive use of nuclear weapons and have enhanced their capabilities to 
undertake preventive or pre-emptive action with conventional means. Evidence of 
a certain convergence may be seen in the widespread criticisms of both French and 
US policy—for instance, supposedly ‘lowering the threshold’ for nuclear weapons 
use.
The points of convergence also include France’s new willingness to recognize 
that non-nuclear means may contribute to deterrence. For many years the French 
rejected the concept of ‘conventional deterrence’, an approach of great interest 
in the United States since the early 1990s, as less reliable than nuclear deterrence 
and even ‘dangerous’.60 However, in 2003 the French acknowledged that ‘the 
improvement of [conventional] capabilities for long-range strikes should constitute 
a deterrent threat for our potential aggressors’.61 Chirac’s January 2006 speech 
added a new recognition in French policy that, as many US experts and offi  cials 
have held for several years, missile defences may also play a complementary role 
58 Tertrais, ‘La dissuasion revisitée’, p. 4.
59 For background, see David S. Yost, ‘The US nuclear posture review and the NATO allies’, International Aff airs 
80: 4, July 2004, pp. 705–29.
60 See e.g. the rejection of ‘conventional deterrence’ in the 1994 White Paper: ‘It is illusory and dangerous to 
claim that they [advanced conventional military technologies] could prevent war like nuclear weapons. All 
the lessons of history plead to the contrary. These conceptions enhance the signifi cance of conventional force 
balances, which are by nature unstable and founded on strategies of use, [that is,] of the preparation and 
conduct of war. They suggest the possibility of resolving international problems through the use of force and 
lead to arms races. They are not compatible with our strategy. Far from substituting for nuclear deterrence, a 
so-called conventional deterrent would only add to it.’ Ministère de la Défense, Livre blanc sur la défense (Paris: 
Service d’Information et de Relations Publiques des Armées, Feb. 1994), p. 56.
61 ‘Loi no. 2003-73 du 27 janvier 2003 relative à la programmation militaire pour les années 2003 à 2008’, section 
2.3.1., ‘Les fonctions stratégiques’, available at www.legifrance.gouv.fr.
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in deterrence. Moreover, some French experts judge that Chirac’s reference to ‘a 
fi rm and appropriate response’ borrowed from well-established US (and British) 
rhetoric intended to uphold deterrence while maintaining some ambiguity.
Some diff erences clearly remain. For example, the United States has not 
explicitly referred to deterring state sponsors of terrorist attacks with a threat of 
nuclear retaliation or to the possibility of EMP attacks as a ‘fi nal warning’ to adver-
saries; and the United States continues to place greater emphasis on non-nuclear 
means of deterrence than does France. Moreover, France remains less committed 
to off ering extending deterrence protection to allies than are the United States and 
the United Kingdom.
While the French have shifted from strongly held positions to adopt policies 
similar in some ways to those of the United States, their intention has obviously 
not been to imitate American choices but to deal with the current and potential 
strategic challenges they discern. Indeed, one of their main motives in adopting 
certain policies that happen to coincide with or resemble US policies has been 
to uphold France’s national autonomy. The French remain, as they have been 
since the 1950s and 1960s, interested in bolstering their freedom of manoeuvre in 
relation to Washington and in lessening their dependence on the United States. 
What some observers have called ‘Americanization’ would therefore be more 
accurately termed a de facto convergence of some key features of independently 
developed US and French policies. Paradoxically, however, the evidence of such 
an ‘Americanization’ of French nuclear strategy is more concrete than that of its 
‘Europeanization’, which remains comparatively speculative and hypothetical.
‘Europeanizing’ France’s nuclear deterrent?
Some highly regarded French experts have expressed support for a ‘Europeaniza-
tion’ of France’s nuclear deterrent posture in the long term. According to Louis 
Gautier, ‘It is diffi  cult to imagine an isolated French strategic posture in the future 
in Europe. Our country can no longer play, as in the Cold War, its little Astérix 
role.62 Either we move towards a common [European] strategic posture, or the 
idea of European autonomy will fail and we will go towards greater dependence 
on the United States.’63
However, despite comments to this eff ect by Defence Minister Alliot-Marie 
and others,64 it is not clear that the French government intended to make Chirac’s 
speech a point of departure for a new dissuasion concertée initiative. The French did 
not prepare their EU partners for such an initiative. Paris did not inform them 
62 Astérix is a French cartoon character created in 1959 by René Goscinny and Albert Uderzo. A small but 
courageous and resourceful warrior, Astérix lives in the only part of ancient Gaul supposedly not conquered 
by Caesar’s Roman legions. He is thus a symbol of French valour, ingenuity and success in resisting foreign 
imperialism and maintaining national independence.
63 Louis Gautier, interviewed by Jean-Dominique Merchet, Libération, 19 Jan. 2006.
64 In his interview on 20 Jan. 2006, the Chief of Staff  of the Armed Forces, General Henri Bentégeat, also said 
that Chirac’s speech was an invitation to France’s European partners to consider ‘as soon as possible’ a common 
defence, and that such a defence would naturally encompass ‘the question of the ultimate protection repre-
sented by nuclear weapons’.
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in advance about Chirac’s speech, much less consult with them about its themes. 
When asked about Chirac’s speech, British Prime Minister Tony Blair said that he 
had ‘only seen reports of it’ after the fact and that he had not ‘carefully analysed’ 
it.65
In her January 2006 testimony, Alliot-Marie gave two reasons for the failure 
of France’s 1995 dissuasion concertée initiative—the United Kingdom’s closeness 
to the United States, and the anti-nuclear attitudes in some EU countries—and 
suggested, without off ering any specifi c evidence, that both are changing.66 
Experts within and outside France noted with interest the fact that she did not 
refer to what may have been an even more important reason for the failure of the 
1995 dissuasion concertée initiative: the series of nuclear tests carried out by France 
in 1995–6.67 The context of the nuclear tests made it appear to many observers 
that France’s initiative for an EU dialogue on nuclear deterrence was intended to 
dampen down the complaints, shift attention away from the tests and even make 
others share responsibility for them. The French were seen as telling their EU 
partners, ‘we’re doing this for your security as much as ours’. This contention was 
rejected in several quarters in Europe, with reactions of disdain and disbelief.
The vocal reactions to Chirac’s speech in Germany in particular suggest how little 
attitudes have changed since the mid-1990s and what an uphill struggle France faces 
if it wishes to persuade its partners to build the EU into an autonomous nuclear-
armed power bloc—what the French call an Europe-puissance. Most EU nations are 
not ready or willing to accept such a ‘nuclearization’ of the EU. Some EU nations 
oppose the very concept, and others prefer to rely on US nuclear protection 
through NATO. Some analysts in EU nations have argued that it would contradict 
the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and be seen as, to quote Peter Schmidt of the 
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik in Berlin, ‘an act of internal proliferation rather 
than as a measure intended to limit the role of nuclear weapons’.68
German and other non-French European analysts have argued that any European 
nuclear consultation mechanism should be built within a NATO framework. This 
approach has, however, been ruled out by French policy since the 1960s. Since its 
initial construction of nuclear forces, Paris has made clear that France alone will 
decide whether and how to use them in defence of its own security or broader 
interests; and it has remained France’s policy to do so without participating in 
NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) or other alliance nuclear consultation 
mechanisms.69 Aside from the discreet Franco-British dialogue that has been under 
way since 1992, no initiatives for a European nuclear consultation forum have to 
65 The Prime Minister’s monthly press conference, 23 Jan. 2006, available at www.primeminister.gov.uk. Blair 
added, ‘I strongly endorse what he is saying about the threat today coming from rogue states, and states that 
are developing in breach of international obligations a nuclear capability.’
66 Alliot-Marie, ‘Audition devant la Commission de la Défense Nationale et des Forces Armées, Assemblée 
Nationale, 25 Jan. 2006’.
67 Some observers hypothesize that Alliot-Marie did not refer to the nuclear test series as a major factor in the 
failure of the 1995 dissuasion concertée initiative because that test series was ordered by President Chirac.
68 Peter Schmidt, ‘La question nucléaire dans les relations franco-allemandes’, Défense Nationale, Aug.–Sept. 2004, 
p. 81.
69 The other alliance nuclear consultation forums, all advisory bodies subordinate to the NPG, include the High 
Level Group, the Joint Theatre Surety Management Group, and the NPG Staff  Group.
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date borne any visible fruit. The French have long been known for championing 
the EU’s autonomy in relation to the United States and NATO. In the nuclear 
domain, despite their various consultation proposals over the years, they have 
often given the impression of favouring French autonomy in relation to their EU 
and NATO partners.70
Conclusion
These issues and others deserve further refl ection and analysis. For example, 
France’s new nuclear doctrine raises the following additional questions: could the 
latest adaptations in doctrine promote closer cooperation between France and the 
United Kingdom? Is dissuasion concertée nonetheless likely to remain an elusive goal, 
in view of the policies of France’s European Union partners? Could the French fi nd 
reason to work more closely with the United States in defi ning complementary 
nuclear strategies? What nuclear force posture options and resources may be neces-
sary in the longer term (2010–2025) to support the latest doctrinal adjustments? 
Furthermore, will France muster the political will and pay the price to sustain 
and modernize its nuclear force posture as well as its other military capabilities? If 
France fails to modernize both its nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities, the adjust-
ments in nuclear doctrine will be of little signifi cance.
Internal politics concerning France’s nuclear deterrent have in recent years 
become closely linked to cost questions, which will probably be an issue in the 2007 
elections.71 The divisions between the center-right UMP (Union pour un Mouvement 
Populaire) and the Socialist Party are likely to concern not only the level of defence 
spending, but also the allocation of funds for nuclear forces and for conven-
tional force modernization (including frigates, A-400M transport aircraft, and a 
second aircraft carrier), as opposed to more funds for military salaries, benefi ts and 
operating expenses. Support for nuclear forces nonetheless appears com paratively 
solid, even on the center-left. While some Socialists, including former defence 
70 The Jan. 1996 French expression of a willingness to participate in a dialogue on nuclear questions within 
the framework of the North Atlantic Council does not appear to have led to any substantive discussions, as 
indicated in note 27 above. The closest the French came to accepting a consultation obligation was perhaps 
in Feb. 1986, when President Mitterrand made the following statement: ‘Within the limits imposed by the 
extreme rapidity of such decisions, the President of the Republic declares himself disposed to consult the 
Chancellor of the FRG [Federal Republic of Germany] on the possible employment of prestrategic French 
weapons on German territory. He notes that the decision cannot be shared in this matter. The President of 
the Republic indicates that he has decided, with the Chancellor of the FRG, to equip himself with technical 
means for immediate and reliable consultation in times of crisis.’ François Mitterrand, statement of 28 Feb. 
1986, published in Le Monde, 2–3 March 1986, p. 4. According to various German and French sources, the 
discussions following Mitterrand’s statement did not result in any practical institutional arrangements for 
consultations. No Franco-German or Franco-NATO understanding on basic political, strategic and opera-
tional principles has ever been reached comparable to the guidelines worked out for US and British nuclear 
weapons in NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group and other alliance nuclear consultation forums. French and 
alliance authorities have nonetheless exchanged views on nuclear issues on some occasions—for example, the 
discussions in 1975 between General Guy Méry, then Chief of Staff  of the French Armed Forces, and General 
Alexander Haig, then SACEUR. For background, see Bruno Tertrais, ‘La coopération militaire depuis 1969: 
La France, l’OTAN, et la question nucléaire’, in Maurice Vaïsse, Pierre Mélandri and Frédéric Bozo, eds, La 
France et l’OTAN, 1949–1996 (Brussel§es: Éditions Complexe, 1996), pp. 617–31.
71 Jacques Favin-Lévêque, ‘Discours de l’Ile Longue: tournant pour la doctrine de dissuasion nucléaire de la 
France?’ Défense Nationale, May 2006, p. 11.
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minister Paul Quilès, have in recent years proposed scaling back France’s nuclear 
ambitions, others—such as Louis Gautier—have argued for modernizing them in 
support of the long-term security interests of France and the European Union. 
Gautier has pointed out that the probable candidacy for President in 2007 of 
Nicolas Sarkozy, the leader of the UMP, could create electoral opportunities for 
the Socialists: ‘Within the military community, the president of the UMP seems 
rather hostile to military spending. Another reason not to leave him this terrain.’ 
The preliminary draft Socialist platform for the 2007 elections states that ‘Nuclear 
deterrence must remain robust’ (en vigueur) and based on ‘independent’ technolo-
gies and decision-making. It is worth recalling that Laurent Fabius, a former prime 
minister and one of the competitors for the Socialist Party’s presidential nomina-
tion, said after Chirac’s January 2006 speech that it contained ‘nothing with which 
I am in profound disagreement.’72
72 Fabius, Gautier and the preliminary draft Socialist platform are cited in Jean-Dominique Merchet, ‘Le projet 
socialiste au banc d’essai (6/7): Faut-il diminuer le budget de la Défense? Rogner sur le porte-avions, pas sur le 
nucléaire’, Libération, 30 May 2006.
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